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Political economy theories of financial development argue that in countries where a 
narrow elite controls political decisions, financial development may be obstructed to 
deny access to finance to potential competitors. We use panel data on developed and 
developing countries from 1975-2000 to examine this hypothesis, as well as looking 
at the effect of regime transitions on financial development. Our results show that the 
degree of democracy and political stability explain differences in the speed of 
financial development and that including these regime characteristics makes legal 




The economic literature studying the effect of financial development on growth has 
provided ample evidence that financial development has a positive effect on long-run 
economic growth.
1 Establishing well-functioning financial markets and financial 
institutions, which attract savings and channel them to productive investment projects, 
should therefore be a policy priority for governments. In recent years the research 
agenda has turned to the question of why many countries nevertheless remain 
financially underdeveloped.  
 
                                                 
1 See Levine (2003) and Demetriades and Andrianova (2004) for excellent recent overviews of the 
literature. 
  1There are a number of potential explanations for and empirical studies of why 
financial development has been slow in a large number of countries. The research 
broadly falls into three interrelated groups. The first group stresses that financial 
institutions do not succeed in an institutional vacuum, but need a legal and regulatory 
environment in which contracts can be enforced and bankers are given strong 
incentives to behave honestly.
2 The second group looks at the links between law and 
finance, showing that specific types of legal system are more conducive to protecting 
investor rights and adapting the law to take into account financial innovations.
3  The 
third group looks at the political economy of financial development arguing that 
financial underdevelopment may be the outcome of political circumstances - 
protecting the interests of a narrow political / industrial elite.
4 Such an elite may have 
little interest in developing well-functioning capital markets, as they are served well 
by relationship banking and the absence of arms’ length finance restricts potential 
competitors’ access to finance.  
 
This paper aims to contribute to the second and third of these arguments by 
empirically evaluating the influence of the political system on financial development. 
For this we study the effect of political variables, which capture the degree to which a 
narrow elite controls the levers of power and the level of regime stability on the 
change in financial development. We use panel data of developed and developing 
countries from 1975 to 2000. We study a number of different aspects of financial 
development. We control for legal origin as well as for exogenous factors driving 
financial development and test whether the importance of political institutions differs 
between legal systems and different time periods. 
 
Our results show that both the degree of democracy in the political system and the 
stability of the political system have statistically significant effects on the annual 
change in financial development. To the extent that democracy restricts the influence 
of elite groups and lobbies by widening political participation, our results provide 
evidence for the Rajan and Zingales (2003) proposition that political systems 
governed by narrow elites obstruct the development of the financial system. 
                                                 
2 e.g. Kaufmann et al (1999), Demirguec-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Andrianova et al (2003) 
3 La Porta et al (1997, 1998), see Beck et al (2001a) for a review 
4 Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
  2Controlling for political regime characteristics directly makes legal origin indicators 
obsolete and provides an important addition to the “settler mortality hypothesis”, 
which argues that development is shaped by colonisation strategies.
5  
 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review of the literature 
and section 3 describes the data used. The methodology is discussed in section 4 and 
results are presented and discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2: Literature Review 
The theoretical literature predicts that financial development is a positive function of 
real income and the real interest rate.
6 Financial markets promote investment through 
debt intermediation and hence generate economic growth. Economic development in 
turn creates demand for finance, so the likely causal effect between financial 
development and economic growth is bi-directional.
7 A positive real interest rate 
increases the volume of savings, increasing financial depth and at the same time 
improves the average productivity of capital by making investment in low return 
projects unattractive; this in turn boosts growth.
8 More recently, however, academic 
inquiry has turned to explanations of why in some countries the virtuous cycle of 
economic and financial development is slow to take off.  
 
Institutional underdevelopment 
Economic development in general and financial development in particular relies on 
good governance.
9 Financial systems need to be regulated and supervised to ensure 
that saver confidence is not undermined by bank failures and that savings are 
channelled to the most productive investments rather than into the pockets of 
connected individuals, or gambled away on high-risk projects.
10 The empirical 
relationship between financial liberalisation and financial crises depends strongly on a 
                                                 
5 Acemoglu (2001), Beck et al (2003a), discussed in detail below. 
6 McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973) 
7 Demetriades and Hussein (1996) 
8 Fry (1997) 
9 Kaufmann et al (1999), Hellmann et al (2000), Akerlof and Romer (1993) 
10 Hellmann et al (2000), also see Perotti (2001) on the case of Russia 
  3country’s institutional environment.
11 Respect for the rule of law, a low level of 
corruption and good contract enforcement are crucial for the efficient functioning of a 
financial system. This literature therefore argues that booms and busts in the financial 
sector and the resulting financial underdevelopment are due to governments’ inability 
to address institutional shortcomings or a lack of understanding of the foundations of 
a sound financial system and hence badly sequenced reforms. 
 
Legal and institutional heritage 
The literature on Law and Finance, however, points to a more fundamental problem: 
some legal systems are not well suited to creating the preconditions for the successful 
development of financial systems and institutions.
12 Financial development 
(especially arms’ length finance) depends on enforcement of outsiders’ property 
rights. The “static” view of law and finance looks at differences in legal traditions 
regarding the comparative rights of individual investors vis-à-vis the state. Common 
law systems were designed to protect investor property against the Crown, creating 
systems in which individuals transact confidently. Civil law on the other hand sets the 
state above the courts and therefore the interests of politically connected heads of 
firms above individual investors.
13  
 
The “dynamic” view of law and finance looks at the adaptability of law to changing 
conditions, giving flexible legal systems an advantage in fostering financial 
development.
14 Common law emerges on a case-by-case basis, so the gap between an 
economy’s needs and the law is quickly closed. On the other extreme is the 
immutable legal code of French civil law (though in practice French law has not been 
static). The more hurdles there are to legal reform, the less investor protection there is 
at the cutting edge of financial innovation, tending to slow down financial 
development.  
 
There are two main critiques of this literature. Firstly some civil law countries 
performed very well in terms of financial development in the early 20
th century.
15 The 
                                                 
11 Demirguec-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
12 See Beck et al (2001a) for a review of the literature 
13 La Porta et al (1997, 1998)  
14 Beck et al (2001b) 
15 e.g France, Germany, Argentina and Russia  
  4disadvantages of civil law only appear when studying countries after 1970.
16 Secondly 
there is as large a discrepancy in terms of financial development within as between 
legal origins. British legal origin does not appear to have been a panacea for Nigeria, 
Pakistan and Zimbabwe, while Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands do not 
appear particularly encumbered by their French legal origin.  
 
One way in which the second puzzle of diverging performance within legal origin 
groups has been addressed is to pay attention to the colonisation strategy employed in 
different countries. Acemoglu (2001) argues that in countries with high mortality rates 
for European colonisers, institutions were set up to allow a small elite to extract 
precious raw materials.
17 When the colonisers left, post-colonial elites took over the 
same institutions to continue to extract surpluses. In more benign climates, Europeans 
settled and established institutions to protect long-run economic interests.
18 Once a 
particular system has been set up, it advantages the interest groups benefiting from the 
system within the political process. Hence even inefficient systems are perpetuated; 
there is “path dependence”.
19 The “settler mortality” hypothesis has been directly 
applied to financial development in Beck et al (2003), providing empirical evidence 
that the institutional endowment matters.  
 
Political economy  
Another way of looking at the divergent performance of countries with similar legal 
systems over time is to look at the political system in which decisions about economic 
policies are made. North (1990) and Olson (1993) argue that those in power shape 
policies and institutions to stay in power and enrich themselves. Financial 
underdevelopment may therefore be a deliberate policy choice by incumbents. An 
established military / industrial elite may be advantaged in a system in which entry of 
new firms is restricted through limited access to financial capital by outsiders. For 
well-connected and well-capitalised firms access to finance would be available 
through a system of relationship banking, regardless of disclosure standards and 
contract enforcement.
20 At best, therefore there is no political pressure for the 
                                                 
16 Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
17 E.g. Tropical Africa 
18 E.g. Australia, New Zealand, the US 
19 Bebchuk and Roe (1999); Acemoglu (2001), Zanella et al (2003) 
20 Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
  5development of arms’ length finance leading to a policy of neglect regarding 
institutional fundamentals. At worst the development of financial markets could be 
actively sabotaged through state control over the financial sector.
21  
 
The political economy literature is therefore linked to the previous explanations of 
legal endowments and institutional underdevelopment. Countries in which extractive 
institutions were set up by colonial powers to avoid large-scale permanent settlement 
have often continued to privilege small elites. These post-colonial elites have 
continued to restrict suffrage in the political system and have limited access to 
economic resources to those within their own group.
22 In such systems there are no 
incentives to put into place a legal system that protects individuals’ rights against the 
state, to protect property rights and create regulatory and supervisory institutions – i.e. 
to create the institutional preconditions for successful financial development.  
 
A first test of a political economy model of financial development was undertaken by 
Rajan and Zingales (2003). Their paper tests the hypothesis that during times of high 
international capital mobility and in countries with a high degree of trade openness 
there would be higher levels of financial development: Capital mobility and open 
trade undermine both the ability and the incentive of incumbents to suppress domestic 
financial development. Under conditions of trade openness incumbents need 
investment finance to remain competitive, while periods of high international capital 
flows offer incumbent firms the option to tap international financial markets. They 
show that the exogenous component of a country’s trade as well as an interaction term 
between trade openness and international capital mobility have a significant and 




However, this methodology does not directly address the question of the importance 
of the domestic political system in financial development. There are no variables 
describing the political regime characteristics directly. Therefore the focus of this 
paper is the effect of domestic regime characteristics on the speed of financial 
                                                 
21La Porta et al (2001), also see the literature on state ownership of banks  
22 Aided in this perhaps by a civil law system that favours centralisation of power. 
23 Both trade and financial openness variables are chosen to be exogenous to the political process: the 
decision to open trade and capital flows is in itself political. The trade openness proxy is based on a 
  6development. We firstly examine the effect of the extent to which political system 
restricts suffrage. In autocratic regimes the interests of a narrow elite consisting of 
those holding capital in labour-rich economies (and especially the owners of state-
sponsored “infant industries”) may prevail against the interests of labour, the 
unemployed and potential new entrants. Therefore the more concentrated power and 
the more non-democratic the system, the more likely it is, that a small industrial elite 
of the type described by Rajan and Zingales (2003) can use its control over policy-
making to restrict financial development. Secondly we aim to capture the effect of 
political instability on financial development. We would expect a negative effect from 
major changes in the polity, as social capital is destroyed.  
 
 
3: Data  
The focus of this paper is on the factors that facilitate, restrict or reverse financial 
development. The aspect of financial development we are most interested in from a 
political economy point of view is how easy it is for any investor (not just the well-
connected ones) to obtain finance for investment projects. That is we are looking for 
indicators of “arms-length finance”. We look at three indicators of financial 
development:  
•  Private sector credit /GDP
24  
•  Stock market capitalisation / GDP 
•  Total stock market value traded / GDP
25 
We would expect the strongest results for stock market development, as bank lending 
can be relationship-based, preserving elite control over finance. Higher-level 
institutional requirements need to be in place for stock market to function effectively 
and be trusted by small investors. We use the database of financial development from 
Beck  et al (2003b), noting that there is a limited data-set for the stock market 
capitalisation and trade ratio:
26  
                                                                                                                                            
country’s size and proximity to trade partners or purely on population size. Capital flows are measured 
at the systemic level.  
24 We do not want to capture financial flows to state-owned enterprises controlled by the elite. 
25 This measure of stock market liquidity distinguishes between stock markets in which there is a large 
degree of government involvement and those in which trading is active, encouraging small investor 
participation.  
26 Data are available from 1975 at best, which determines the starting date for the regression analysis. 
Data availability for the banking sector is in general much better than for stock markets. The data 
  7 
We include lagged GDP growth as an independent variable to capture the effect of 
increased demand for financial services, in line with the theoretical literature on 
financial development discussed above. However, we omit the real interest rate from 
the reported regressions. Firstly whether the real interest rate is positive or negative is 
partially a political decision, linked to a policy of financial liberalisation. Secondly, 
data availability on the real interest rate is patchy, reducing our sample by one quarter 
on the banking sector variables and one-fifth on the stock market capitalisation 




To proxy for the extent of incumbent power we use the “combined polity score” -
polity2
28 - as measured by the Polity IV database (Marshall et al 2003).
29 The Polity 
variable was designed to record the regime's institutionalized authority characteristics. 
Firstly, the database records a democracy score (ranging from 0 to 10) for each 
country, based on the openness of the political process (i.e. the extent to which 
citizens can effectively express preferences about policies and leaders through 
elections) and the degree of restraints on the powers of the chief executive. The 
maximum score would be allocated to a democracy in which the executive is chosen 
in free and fair elections with universal suffrage and there are substantial checks and 
balances constraining the chief executive’s power.
30 Secondly each country has an 
autocracy score (again ranging from 0 to 10) based on how political leaders are 
selected (e.g. by designation or chosen from closed lists), the constraints on their 
powers and the regulation and competitiveness of political participation.
31 Polities 
may have mixed authority traits and can have intermediate scores on both the 
                                                                                                                                            
availability for indicators of the development of the bond markets in the Beck et al (2003) database is 
too poor for the purpose of this analysis. 
27 If the real interest rate is included in the regressions it has the expected positive effect on financial 
development, however, it is only statistically significant in outlier-robust regressions. 
28 Polity2 imputes normal ranges of polity scores for special polity conditions such as periods of 
transition and periods of collapse of the central authority. State failures due to occupations are left 
blank.  
29 See Polity IV project Data-set Users Manual 
30 The scale therefore discriminates between developed democratic systems on the basis of their 
limitation on the powers of the chief executive, for example France’s democracy score increases with 
the onset of “cohabitation” during the Mitterrand presidency. 
31 Regulation refers to who participates in the political process (has the right to vote), competitiveness 
to whether the opposition is suppressed (single party states) or restricted. 
  8democracy and authority scores.
32 Subtracting the autocracy score from the 
democracy score of a country creates the polity2 variable. Higher scores of polity2 
therefore indicate a higher degree of democracy.  
 
An incumbent elite is more likely to be able to block financial development by 
impeding reforms in more authoritarian systems, as opposition demands for more 
equal access to resources can be ignored.
33 In democracies the influence of lobbies is 
reduced through systems of checks and balances, as they increase the number of veto-
players that have to be bribed. The polity2  variable therefore appears to be a 
reasonable proxy of elite control over policies that advance or hinder financial 
development. We also experimented with concentration of power within the 




We do not include direct indicators of institutional quality (such as rule of law, 
corruption, government effectiveness and transparency) in our regressions, as these in 
part reflect political regime characteristics: in more democratic systems corrupt and 
ineffective politicians are voted out of power. However, we include an indicator of 
political instability to reflect that financial development requires a certain level of 
social development, trust and reputation. Upheaval in the political system results in 
the loss of human and social capital, uncertainty and the breakdown of long-term 
economic relationships. Fear of confiscation due to frequent regime changes leads 
people to hold physical assets instead of financial assets. We use the number of years 
that have elapsed since a major regime transition, either a move towards democracy, a 
major clamp-down on civil rights or the foundation or independence of a state: the 
variable “durable” from Polity IV. We use the durability variable from the 2003 
version of the database, in which durability has been re-calculated and extended back 
to the beginning of the data series. It now correctly displays state failure through 
                                                 
32 For example South Africa in the 1980s has a democracy score of 7 and an autocracy score of 3, 
reflecting that within a relatively democratic system political participation was restricted to white South 
Africans. 
33 Acemoglu (2003), Pagano and Volpin (2003) 
34 Herfindahl index: the Herfindahl index increases in the concentration of power within parliament 
with the highest score going to single-party states. This proxy again reflects the competitiveness of 
elections on the one hand and the restrictions on the power of the executive. The regression results are 
extremely similar to the ones using the polity2 indicator and are available upon request. 
  9occupation in continental Europe in the 1940s. Table 1a provides some summary 
statistics of the changes in the financial development indicators and the level of 
political variables employed in the paper. The countries with the fastest financial 
development are considerably more democratic and stable than the median, while 
those countries that experience financial disintermediation are on average highly 
autocratic and /or have unstable regimes. 
 
We control for trade openness as suggested by Rajan and Zingales (2003), again 
noting that a country’s actual openness is partly endogenous to the political process. 
Therefore we prefer to use the exogenous component of trade determined by 
economic geographical factors rather than actual openness. Gravity models of trade 
argue that bilateral trade flows are a log-linear function of the sizes of and the 
distance between trading partners.
35 Small nations are less self-sufficient and are 
therefore predisposed towards greater openness. Frankel and Romer (1999) 
constructed measures of the geographic component of countries’ trade based on: size 
(log area and log economically active population), distances from other countries 
(great circle distances between principal cities), whether they share a border and 
whether they are landlocked, plus some interaction terms. The reported estimate of the 
geographic component of a country’s trade is the sum of the estimated geographic 
components of its bilateral trade with each other country in the world. Data are 
available for 150 countries in the early 1990s.
36
 
In the Rajan and Zingales (2003) paper the international capital mobility is measured 
at the level of the international system.
37 This is again to avoid the problem that actual 
capital mobility is a political choice– certain types of governments are more likely to 
liberalise capital flows.
38 In this paper, changes in international capital mobility, 
which affect all countries simultaneously, are captured through time and period 
dummies
39.  
                                                 
35 Linnemann (1966) 
36 As the data are based on geography alone, there is no variation from 1975 –2000, except Ethiopia, 
and Germany (and some post-Soviet states, which in any case have no data availability before the early 
1990s).  
37 Proxied by the “mean absolute value of current account / GDP over five-year periods for a sample of 
14 developed countries.” From Taylor (1998) 
38 e.g. Alesina et al (1994), Haggard and Maxfield (1996), Li and Smith (2003) 
39 Period 1 = 1976-1980, period 2 = 1981-1985, period 3 = 1986-1990, period 4 = 1991-1995, period 5 
= 1996-2000 
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We control for the origin of a country’s legal system. We augmented the data 
presented in La Porta et al (1998) from CIA World Factbook entry for the legal 
system. We excluded countries with entries that did not fit neatly into the five original 
legal origin categories and introduced a new category for post-Socialist civil law 
codes from 1990 for the same reason.
40 We report results using a civil law dummy 
grouping the German, French, Scandinavian and post-Socialist civil law countries 
together, as there appears to be no difference between the different civil law countries.  
 
Finally we control for whether a country has recently experienced a banking crisis. 
Widespread public loss of confidence may result in a discontinuity in financial 
development. We cannot use the contemporary banking crisis dummy as the 
definition of banking crises contains “widespread bank runs” – in turn linked to the 
contraction of the deposit base, which is one of the dependent variables.
41 We 
therefore use a lagged dummy taken from data in Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and 
Glick and Hutchinson (1999). 
 
Table 1b provides preliminary evidence in favour of the hypotheses outlined above in 
the form of correlation coefficients between the variables. A higher democracy score 
is positively correlated with all proxies for the speed of financial development, with 
the expected negative correlation between concentration of power and financial 
development. Greater regime stability has positive effects on financial development, 
as has intrinsic openness to trade. Bank crises have negative effects on financial 
development, while lagged growth has a positive effect on the banking sector 




We perform the regressions using annual data from 1975 –2000 in so far that they are 
available. Three variants of each model are estimated: (i) and (iv) the effect of the 
                                                 
40 Examples are “Roman-Dutch law” (e.g. Namibia / Botswana) and “Mixture of French and British 
Law” (e.g. Mauritius, Vanuatu) 
41Bank runs are explicitly included in the definition of banking crises in Demirguec-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1997), Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)  
  11political variable (polity2) is assumed to be the same across all periods and countries 
(ii) and (v) the effect of polity2 is allowed to vary by legal origin of the countries in 
the sample and (iii) and (vi) the effect of polity2 is allowed to vary across periods. 
 
Regression equations  
Firstly we look at short-run financial development: 
∆ FDit= β0 + β1 eliteit + β2 stabilityit+ β3 opennessi + β4 legal origini + β5 financial 
crisisit-1 + β6 GDPgrowthit-1 + β7-32 time dummies + εit     (i) 
 
∆ FDit = β0 + β1 eliteit + β2 eliteit*legal origini + β3 stabilityit+ β4 opennessi + β5 legal 
origini + β6 financial crisisit-1 + β7 GDPgrowthit-1 + β8-33 time dummies + εit (ii) 
 
∆ FDit = β0 + β1 eliteit + β2 eliteit*period dummies + β3 stabilityit+ β4 opennessi + β5 
legal origini + β6 financial crisisit-1 + β7 GDPgrowthit-1 + β8-33 time dummies + εit (iii) 
 
We then look at the relationship between changes in financial development and the 
past level of financial development: 
 
∆ FDit= β0 + β1 eliteit + β2 stabilityit+ β3 opennessi + β4 legal origini + β5 financial 
crisisit-1 + β6 GDPgrowthit-1 + β7 FD it-1 + β8-33 time dummies + εit    (iv) 
 
∆ FDit = β0 + β1 eliteit + β2 eliteit*legal origini + β3 stabilityit+ β4 opennessi + β5 legal 
origini + β6 financial crisisit-1 + β7 GDPgrowthit-1 + β8 FD it-1 + β9-34 time dummies + εit
           ( v )  
∆ FDit = β0 + β1 eliteit + β2 eliteit*period dummies + β3 stabilityit+ β4 opennessi + β5 
legal origini + β6 financial crisisit-1 + β7 GDPgrowthit-1 + β8 FD it-1 + β9-34 time 
dummies + εit           ( v i )  
 
 
Financial Development: We report regression results for  
1)  Private sector credit / GDP (credit),  
2)  Stock market capitalisation / GDP (smcap) 
3)  Stock market value traded / GDP (smtrade) 
Elite: Degree of Democracy (polity) or Herfindahl index  
  12Stability: Durability of regime (durability) 
Openness: Geographical pre-disposition to trade (trade) 
Legal Origin: Socialist Law, Civil Law (dummy variables, Common Law as 
baseline)  
 
For each model, three alternative estimation strategies are employed. The first is OLS 
with standard errors, which are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and within 
country serial correlation. It is well known that hetereskedasticity is prevalent in cross 
sectional data sets and within country serial correlation is likely to be present because 
of unobserved country-specific heterogeneity. 
 
A problem frequently encountered in estimation relates to outliers. The inclusion or 
exclusion of outliers, especially if the sample size is small, can substantially alter the 
results of regression analysis.  If useful generalisations are to be drawn, it is thus 
important to ensure that the results reflect what is going on in the majority of the 
sample rather than being driven by a few outlying observations only. Our sample has 
a number of extreme outliers, both positive and negative.
42  For this reason we deploy 
a second estimation strategy in this study: outlier robust regression (Rousseeuw and 
Leroy, 1987). This is essentially a three-step procedure.  The first step involves 
estimating the regression and calculating Cook’s distance measure of influence. 
Cook’s distance (D) for the i
th observation is a measure of the distance between the 
coefficient estimates when observation i is included and when it is not, and it is 
defined as   
k






i =    
where  si e ˆ refers to standardised residuals,  to standard error of the residuals and 
to standard error of prediction.  k represents the number of independent variables 
including the intercept term.   
ri s
pi s
High values of Cook’s D imply that the ith observation has significant 
influence on estimation results, therefore, can be deemed to be an outlier.  The second 
step in robust regressions is to screen data points in search of such outliers and 
                                                 
42 See diagrams 1-3 
  13eliminates observations for which Cook’s distance exceeds 1 – these are the gross 
outliers.  Thereafter, robust regression involves an iterative weighted least squares 
method whereby outliers are identified and weights are assigned.  
 
The two estimation procedures outlined above (i.e. OLS and outlier robust 
regressions) assume that the political variables are exogenous to the model 
determining the growth of financial development. In the course of our empirical 
investigation we have relaxed this assumption and employ a generalised method of 
moments (GMM) procedure due to Hansen (1982). To this end twice lagged values of 
the polity2 variable interacted with the legal origin dummies are used as instrumental 
variable candidates. We are careful to check the appropriateness of the instrumental 
variable candidates in two respects. First, their validity in the sense of having no 
correlation with the equation error is formally tested with the aid of Hansen’s (1982) 
test for overidentifying restrictions (which is the robust version of the classical Sargan 
test statistic). Second, we ascertain that they are relevant in that they exhibit 
sufficiently strong correlation with the potentially endogenous regressor (i.e. polity2). 
It has been noted in the econometric literature that when the partial correlation 
between the instruments and the endogenous variable is low, instrumental variables 
regression is biased in the direction of OLS estimator (see e.g. Staiger and Stock, 
1997). Staiger and Stock (1997) recommend that the F-statistics
43 (or the partial R-
square values) from the first-stage regression be routinely reported in applied work. A 
high partial R-squared of the excluded instruments or a large F-statistic suggests the 
instruments are relevant, instrumental variable or GMM estimates are reliable in finite 
samples. By contrast, when the F-statistic is small or the partial R-square value is low, 
inference based on instrumental variable estimates would be unreliable. Reassuringly 
we find that our instruments are appropriate on both counts (see Table A of the 
appendix). A comparison of the OLS and GMM estimates via Hausman test statistics 
reveals that the two are not systematically different, suggesting that the assumption of 
exogeneity of the polity2 variable is justified. For this reason we restrict our 
discussion to the results obtained from the OLS and outlier-robust regressions, and the 
GMM estimates are relegated to the appendix 
 
                                                 
43 The F-statistic tests the hypothesis that the instruments should be excluded from the first-stage regressions. 
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5: Results 
Table 2 presents results for equation (i), in which the pure polity indicator is used. 
The polity proxy has a positive coefficient, showing that more democratic countries 
tend to have faster financial development, as predicted by the political economy 
literature. The proxy is highly statistically significant in the banking sector 
regressions, but insignificant in 3 out of the four stock market regressions. The second 
political regime proxy, durability, has a positive coefficient: countries, which have not 
experienced a major regime transition for a long time tend to have faster financial 
development than those, which have more recently gone through major upheaval. 
Durability is statistically significant in all regression specifications. A civil law 
system appears to be a statistically significant explanatory variable for stock market 
capitalisation in the outlier robust regression, but with an unexpected positive 
coefficient. Otherwise civil law is not significant, once political regime characteristics 
are controlled for.
44 Socialist legal origin on the other hand enters as a significant 
variable with an unexpected positive coefficient.
45 Of the control variables the lagged 
banking crisis has the expected negative effect in 5 out of 6 specifications, significant 
at least at the 5% level. Lagged GDP growth appears to have the expected positive 
effect on the banking system variable (significant at the 1% level), but none on stock 
market development. Finally there is some evidence that countries naturally more 
open to trade have faster banking sector development, while there may be negative 
effects on the stock market.  
 
Table 3 presents results for the polity indicator interacted with the legal origin 
categories (regression ii). The polity proxy again has the expected positive coefficient 
in all regressions, but is only significant for three of the regressions. The interaction 
term between polity and civil law is only significant (and negative) in one regression 
specification. The significant, but mostly negative coefficient of the polity score 
interacted with Socialist legal origin is likely to be driven by the recent good 
performance of the Chinese economy despite its closed political system. The 
                                                 
44 When the legal origins are separated into French, German, Scandinavian and Post-Socialist none is 
statistically significant, so for brevity the variables are summarised in one dummy.  
45 However, these results are based on a very narrow set of data, with only China reporting on its 
burgeoning stock market in the 1990s and the banking sector observations based on observations from 
Poland, Hungary in the 1980s and China in the 1990s. 
  15durability proxy is again statistically significant and positive. Banking crises have 
statistically significant negative effects in 5 out of the 6 regressions. Again 
predisposition to trading and lagged GDP growth both contribute to banking sector 
development, with apparently negative effects on the stock market.  
 
Table 4 looks at the effect of the degree of democracy in different time periods 
(regression iii). It appears that the effect of democratic governments on financial 
development was strongest in the period from 1996-2000, contributing to both 
banking sector and stock market growth. It was also positive and significant in other 
periods, but the evidence is less clear. Durability again has positive and generally 
highly significant effects on the speed of financial development. Civil law does not 
appear to have a clear effect on financial development. Financial crises disrupt 
financial development in the following year. Trade and lagged GDP growth again 
spur banking sector development. The effect of trade on stock market development 
appears to be negative, while there is no link between lagged GDP growth and stock 
market capitalisation and trade.  
 
The year dummies in all three tables show a pattern of strong expansions in private 
sector credit in the late 1970s and early 1980s and again in 1996-1999. Stock market 
development was particularly strong in the mid 1990s. Given the Rajan and Zingales 
hypothesis that financial development is stimulated by international capital mobility, 
one might have expected a stronger pattern with financial development taking off 
after the late 1980s with capital account liberalisation in Europe and beyond.  
 
When we include the lagged level of the financial development indicators among the 
explanatory variables (regressions (iv)-(vi)), it is a highly significant explanatory 
variable of the change in financial development in all of the outlier robust 
regressions.
46 The positive coefficient indicates that the lagged level is picking up 
unobserved country effects, which raise both present and past financial development. 
While the signs and coefficients on the political regime variables are mostly relatively 
robust, significance levels tend to decline. Overall the result of the positive effects of 
regime durability and democracy in the late 1990s are, however, preserved. An 
                                                 
46 Results reported in tables 5-7 
  16explanation for the decline in significance levels is the correlation between the level 
of financial development (credit and stock market capitalisation) and the political 
regime variables (shown in table 8). Multicollinearity would tend to increase the 
standard errors of the coefficients and hence decrease the reported significance levels. 
 
In summary, the development of the market for private sector credit appears to be 
furthered in democratic systems and stable polities. The positive effect of democracy 
on banking sector development appears to be particularly strong in the late 1990s and 
does not appear to vary across legal origins. Countries intrinsically more open to trade 
and those experiencing faster economic growth also have faster banking sector 
development. Demand for finance (and trade finance in particular) appears to boost 
the banking sector. Banking crises have negative effects on credit growth.  
 
Stock market development on the other hand responds positively to political stability, 
but the degree of democracy only appears to have mainly mattered in the late 1990s. 
Banking crises and a geographical predisposition to trade openness affect stock 
market growth negatively. There is no statistically significant positive effect of lagged 
GDP growth on stock market capitalisation and trade in shares, but there is some 
evidence that stock markets are driven by exogenous factors at the systemic level 
(such as capital mobility) that are picked up by the year dummies.  
 
Given that narrow elites would be more likely to develop (potentially relationship-
based) banking than arms’ length financial markets, it is surprising that the effects of 
the polity variables in the stock market regressions are less robust than for the banking 
sector. Note, however, the stock market regression results are based on a sample that 
is about half the sample size of the banking sector development. When looking at the 
sub-sample of countries in which stock market capitalisation is observed (using cross-
sectional time-series logit analysis) it emerges that the probability of observing stock 
market data rises significantly in durable and / or democratic regimes.
47 The 
regression results on the stock market variables reported above therefore 
systematically under-estimate the importance of the political regime characteristics.  
When we include the missing observations of stock market capitalisation and trade 
                                                 
47 See table 9 
  17ratios in the regressions and assume that the same process governs whether or not 
there is a stock market and how fast it grows if it does exist, we can use Panel Tobit 
analysis.
48 Tables 10 and 11 show that when making these assumptions, the effects of 
both polity variables on stock market capitalisation and stock market trade are now 




From our panel data analysis political regime characteristics have emerged as 
significant factors influencing the speed of financial development, alongside the 
conventional determinants of financial development stemming from arguments of 
demand for finance and controls for discontinuities created by financial crises. 
Regime durability is highly statistically significant in all specifications of the 
regressions and affects all aspects of financial development. A more representative 
political system has positive effects on affects all aspects of financial development, 
with the greatest and most robust effects in the late 1990s. We therefore provide 
empirical evidence for the arguments made in the political economy literature on 
financial development. More autocratic regimes representing the interests of narrow 
but powerful elites appear to delay and obstruct financial development.
49 Once we 
control for the degree to which a narrow elite controls the levers of power, whether or 
not the legal system is based on a civil law code no longer appears to matter.  
 
A further strong message is that political upheaval (regardless of whether this is a 
move towards democracy or autocracy or a state failure) is detrimental to financial 
development. This result provides an additional explanation for the patterns of 
financial development observed in Rajan and Zingales (2003) with Latin American 
and continental European countries seeing a strong reversal in financial development 
after 1913. It is possible that their financial systems were devastated by wars, 
occupations and revolutions, and social capital was destroyed by transitions and 
                                                 
48 In fact a Heckmann test would be preferable, as the two processes may be quite different. However, 
at present we are not aware of Heckmann tests for panel data.  
49 This evidence is in line with the settler mortality hypothesis of financial development to the extent 
that political systems privileging narrow elites are perpetuated after colonisation. 
  18reforms. Financial development recovered again in times of peace, perhaps with an 
added impetus from international capital mobility. 
 
The importance of the durability indicator also provides an alternative / addition to the 
settler mortality hypothesis to explain variations in financial development within legal 
origin groups.
50 Very high levels of financial development are experienced in 
Switzerland, Britain, the US and the white Commonwealth, which enjoyed political 
stability in which financial development could prosper. Intermediate levels of 
financial development are posted by continental European countries, in which 
financial development was interrupted by state-failures (e.g. occupation in Belgium, 
France and the Netherlands) or autocratic experiments followed by democratic 
transitions (e.g. Spain, Greece). The lowest levels of financial development are seen 
in those countries with the most volatile political systems, regardless of legal origin or 
climatic / health conditions (e.g. Turkey, Pakistan, Nigeria, Argentina). Given the 
results from this analysis it would therefore be interesting to re-examine the data in 
Beck et al (2003a) and Rajan and Zingales (2003) in the light of the “regime stability” 
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Table 1a 
Financial growth and politics: 
Summary statistics 
  Deposits   Credit  Stock   Polity2  Durability 
Mean 0.009 0.010 0.023 0.439 22.198 
Standard deviation  0.038 0.046 0.158 7.612 24.029 
Lower quartile  -0.007 -0.006 -0.009 -7 4 
Median 0.006 0.006 0.008 -1 14 






Pair-wise correlations on speed of financial development  
 
  d.credit  d.deposits d.smcap  polity2 herfind.  durabil.   lgrowth   lbank.  trade 
d.credit 1.0000   
d.deposits  0.4211   1.0000  
d. sm cap  -0.0123   0.0665   1.0000  
Polity2  0.0556   0.0676   0.0650   1.0000  
Herfindahl  -0.0584  -0.0733  -0.0516  -0.6322  1.0000  
Durability  0.0868   0.1056   0.0831   0.2293   -0.1363   1.0000  
l.growth  0.1147   0.0840  -0.0155  -0.0487   0.0104   0.0506   1.0000  
l.bank crisis  -0.0791  -0.0401  -0.0577   0.0997  -0.0969  -0.0781 -0.0656  1.0000 
trade  0.0495   0.1655   0.0203   0.0372  -0.0855   0.1433   0.0401  -0.1104   1.0000 
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Table 2 
   
  OLS with robust standard errors  Outlier robust regression  
  ∆ credit  ∆ smtrade  ∆ smcap  ∆ credit  ∆ dsmtrade  ∆ smcap 
polity2  0.0003  0.0007  0.0010  0.0002  0.0001  0.0002 
  (0.0002)**  (0.0004)  (0.0003)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)  (0.0002) 
durability2  0.0002  0.0006  0.0004  0.0001  0.0001  0.0002 
  (0.0000)***  (0.0002)**  (0.0002)**  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***  (0.0000)***
trade  0.0037 -0.0169  -0.0018  0.0041 -0.0020  -0.0154 
  (0.0023)  (0.0068)** (0.0051)  (0.0019)** (0.0015)  (0.0033)***
Lbankcris  -0.0080 -0.0153 -0.0206 -0.0079 -0.0002 -0.0108 
  (0.0033)** (0.0076)** (0.0092)** (0.0015)*** (0.0014)  (0.0030)***
Lgdpgrowth  0.0010 -0.0017  -0.0005  0.0009 -0.0002  0.0003 
 (0.0003)***  (0.0009)*  (0.0017)  (0.0001)*** (0.0001)  (0.0003) 
legor==2  0.0005 0.0093 0.0065 0.0001 -0.0004  0.0052 
  (0.0020) (0.0086) (0.0075) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0025)** 
legor==5  0.0290 0.0462 0.0298 0.0150 0.0644 0.0134 
  (0.0079)*** (0.0128)*** (0.0124)**  (0.0058)*** (0.0064)*** (0.0146) 
year==1976  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
year==1977  0.0031 0.0093 -0.0018  0.0054 -0.0017  -0.0013 
  (0.0028) (0.0046)**  (0.0095) (0.0040) (0.0051) (0.0121) 
year==1978  0.0131 0.0077 0.0000 0.0098 0.0047 0.0000 
  (0.0038)***  (0.0112) (0.0000) (0.0039)**  (0.0051) (0.0000) 
year==1979  0.0092 0.0021 0.0170 0.0031 0.0012 0.0063 
  (0.0051)*  (0.0064) (0.0077)**  (0.0039) (0.0051) (0.0110) 
year==1980  0.0019 0.0174 0.0209 0.0028 0.0040 0.0056 
  (0.0035) (0.0078)**  (0.0091)**  (0.0039) (0.0051) (0.0109) 
year==1981  0.0118 0.0113 0.0133 0.0095 0.0012 0.0051 
 (0.0035)***  (0.0064)*  (0.0072)*  (0.0039)**  (0.0049)  (0.0107) 
year==1982  0.0159 -0.0055  0.0154 0.0085 -0.0015  0.0021 
  (0.0040)***  (0.0103) (0.0093) (0.0039)**  (0.0049) (0.0103) 
year==1983  0.0070 0.0181 0.0003 0.0066 0.0055 0.0125 
  (0.0034)** (0.0075)** (0.0206)  (0.0039)*  (0.0049)  (0.0103) 
year==1984  -0.0063 -0.0058 0.0062  0.0002  0.0004  0.0129 
  (0.0050) (0.0095) (0.0158) (0.0038) (0.0049) (0.0101) 
year==1985  -0.0028  0.0288 0.0438 0.0011 0.0084 0.0189 
  (0.0040) (0.0146)*  (0.0194)**  (0.0038) (0.0048)*  (0.0101)* 
year==1986  0.0073 0.0298 0.0609 0.0051 0.0132 0.0272 
  (0.0053) (0.0094)*** (0.0202)*** (0.0038) (0.0048)***  (0.0101)***
year==1987  0.0017 0.0421 0.0523 0.0036 0.0064 0.0170 
  (0.0052) (0.0119)*** (0.0243)**  (0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0100)* 
year==1988  0.0014 -0.0077  0.0330 0.0030 -0.0046  0.0162 
  (0.0049) (0.0106) (0.0153)**  (0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0100) 
year==1989  0.0072 0.0305 0.0137 0.0072 0.0071 0.0293 
  (0.0053) (0.0109)*** (0.0380) (0.0038)*  (0.0048) (0.0100)***
year==1990  0.0037 -0.0200  -0.0503  0.0042 -0.0040  -0.0010 
  (0.0041) (0.0125) (0.0449) (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0100) 
year==1991  0.0022 0.0015 0.0111 0.0024 0.0043 0.0126 
  (0.0038) (0.0086) (0.0118) (0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0099) 
year==1992  0.0037 0.0155 0.0276 0.0053 0.0027 0.0113 
  (0.0041) (0.0106) (0.0143)*  (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0099) 
  25year==1993  0.0027 0.0936 0.0978 0.0041 0.0141 0.0364 
  (0.0042) (0.0359)**  (0.0229)*** (0.0037) (0.0046)***  (0.0097)***
year==1994  -0.0047 0.0165  0.0663  -0.0008 0.0124  0.0389 
  (0.0038) (0.0155) (0.0147)*** (0.0037) (0.0046)***  (0.0097)***
year==1995  0.0043 -0.0078  0.0090 0.0054 -0.0020  0.0153 
  (0.0041) (0.0165) (0.0117) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0096) 
year==1996  0.0100 0.0347 0.0414 0.0068 0.0046 0.0239 
  (0.0042)** (0.0174)** (0.0216)*  (0.0037)*  (0.0045)  (0.0095)** 
year==1997  0.0142 0.0616 0.0068 0.0104 0.0088 0.0283 
 (0.0040)***  (0.0130)*** (0.0258)  (0.0037)*** (0.0045)*  (0.0094)***
year==1998  0.0251 0.0264 0.0359 0.0186 0.0008 0.0136 
  (0.0045)***  (0.0240) (0.0237) (0.0038)*** (0.0045) (0.0094) 
year==1999  0.0074 0.0979 0.0701 0.0082 0.0032 0.0128 
  (0.0048) (0.0332)*** (0.0223)*** (0.0038)**  (0.0045) (0.0094) 
year==2000  0.0063 0.0699 0.0206 0.0039 0.0024 0.0124 
  (0.0085) (0.0443) (0.0215) (0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0095) 
Constant -0.0054 -0.0187 -0.0215 -0.0044 -0.0020 -0.0113 
  (0.0028)* (0.0105)* (0.0137)  (0.0030)  (0.0042)  (0.0088) 
Observations  2257 1338 1252 2257 1338 1252 
R-squared  0.08 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.11 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
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  OLS with robust standard errors  Outlier robust regression  
  ∆ credit  ∆ smtrade  ∆ smcap  ∆ credit  ∆ dsmtrade  ∆ smcap 
polity2  0.0005  0.0002  0.0009  0.0002  0.0004  0.0001 
  (0.0002)**  (0.0012)  (0.0009)  (0.0001)*  (0.0002)**  (0.0003) 
Civil *polit_2  -0.0002  0.0006  0.0001  -0.0000  -0.0004  0.0000 
  (0.0003)  (0.0012)  (0.0010)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)**  (0.0004) 
Socialist*polit_5  -0.0021  -0.0058  -0.0041  0.0187  -0.0097  -0.0018 
  (0.0012)*  (0.0024)**  (0.0024)*  (0.0051)*** (0.0009)***  (0.0021) 
durability2  0.0002  0.0006  0.0004  0.0001  0.0001  0.0002 
  (0.0000)***  (0.0002)**  (0.0002)**  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***  (0.0000)***
trade  0.0041 -0.0177  -0.0020  0.0041 -0.0015  -0.0155 
 (0.0023)*  (0.0068)**  (0.0058)  (0.0019)**  (0.0015)  (0.0033)***
Lbankcris  -0.0080 -0.0153 -0.0206 -0.0079 -0.0002 -0.0108 
  (0.0033)** (0.0076)** (0.0092)** (0.0015)*** (0.0014)  (0.0030)***
Lgdpgrowth  0.0010 -0.0017  -0.0005  0.0009 -0.0002  0.0003 
 (0.0003)***  (0.0009)*  (0.0017)  (0.0001)*** (0.0001)  (0.0003) 
legor==2  0.0011 0.0065 0.0058 0.0001 0.0010 0.0050 
  (0.0019) (0.0078) (0.0061) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0030)* 
legor==5  0.0172 0.0000 0.0000 0.1507 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0038)***  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0347)*** (0.0000) (0.0000) 
year==1976  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
year==1977  0.0031 0.0093 -0.0018  0.0054 -0.0019  -0.0012 
  (0.0028) (0.0045)**  (0.0095) (0.0039) (0.0051) (0.0121) 
year==1978  0.0131 0.0079 0.0000 0.0098 0.0044 0.0000 
  (0.0038)***  (0.0111) (0.0000) (0.0039)**  (0.0051) (0.0000) 
year==1979  0.0093 0.0024 0.0171 0.0031 0.0009 0.0064 
  (0.0051)*  (0.0061) (0.0077)**  (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0110) 
year==1980  0.0019 0.0177 0.0210 0.0028 0.0037 0.0057 
  (0.0035) (0.0079)**  (0.0090)**  (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0109) 
year==1981  0.0118 0.0117 0.0134 0.0095 0.0009 0.0051 
 (0.0035)***  (0.0065)*  (0.0072)*  (0.0039)**  (0.0049)  (0.0107) 
year==1982  0.0159 -0.0050  0.0155 0.0084 -0.0019  0.0021 
  (0.0040)***  (0.0099) (0.0094) (0.0039)**  (0.0049) (0.0103) 
year==1983  0.0071 0.0185 0.0005 0.0066 0.0050 0.0125 
 (0.0034)**  (0.0075)**  (0.0208)  (0.0039)*  (0.0049)  (0.0103) 
year==1984  -0.0063  -0.0056  0.0063 0.0001 0.0001 0.0130 
  (0.0050) (0.0093) (0.0159) (0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0101) 
year==1985  -0.0026  0.0288 0.0439 0.0010 0.0083 0.0189 
  (0.0040) (0.0145)*  (0.0195)**  (0.0038) (0.0048)*  (0.0101)* 
year==1986  0.0074 0.0297 0.0609 0.0051 0.0132 0.0272 
  (0.0053) (0.0094)*** (0.0202)*** (0.0038) (0.0048)***  (0.0101)***
year==1987  0.0019 0.0420 0.0523 0.0036 0.0065 0.0170 
  (0.0052) (0.0119)*** (0.0243)**  (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0100)* 
year==1988  0.0017 -0.0077  0.0331 0.0030 -0.0047  0.0162 
  (0.0050) (0.0105) (0.0153)**  (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0100) 
year==1989  0.0076 0.0305 0.0138 0.0077 0.0070 0.0293 
  (0.0054) (0.0109)*** (0.0380) (0.0038)**  (0.0047) (0.0100)***
year==1990  0.0039 -0.0201  -0.0503  0.0041 -0.0039  -0.0009 
  (0.0042) (0.0125) (0.0449) (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0100) 
year==1991  0.0024 0.0015 0.0111 0.0023 0.0041 0.0126 
  27  (0.0038) (0.0085) (0.0119) (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0099) 
year==1992  0.0039 0.0155 0.0276 0.0053 0.0027 0.0112 
  (0.0042) (0.0105) (0.0143)*  (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0099) 
year==1993  0.0029 0.0935 0.0978 0.0040 0.0143 0.0364 
  (0.0042) (0.0360)**  (0.0229)*** (0.0037) (0.0046)***  (0.0097)***
year==1994  -0.0044 0.0163  0.0663  -0.0008 0.0125  0.0389 
  (0.0038) (0.0155) (0.0147)*** (0.0037) (0.0046)***  (0.0097)***
year==1995  0.0045 -0.0079  0.0091 0.0054 -0.0019  0.0153 
  (0.0041) (0.0165) (0.0117) (0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0096) 
year==1996  0.0102 0.0345 0.0414 0.0067 0.0050 0.0239 
  (0.0043)**  (0.0174)* (0.0216)* (0.0037)* (0.0045)  (0.0095)** 
year==1997  0.0144 0.0615 0.0069 0.0104 0.0085 0.0283 
 (0.0041)***  (0.0130)*** (0.0258)  (0.0037)*** (0.0045)*  (0.0094)***
year==1998  0.0253 0.0262 0.0359 0.0186 0.0006 0.0136 
  (0.0045)***  (0.0239) (0.0238) (0.0038)*** (0.0045) (0.0094) 
year==1999  0.0077 0.0977 0.0701 0.0082 0.0032 0.0128 
 (0.0047)  (0.0332)*** (0.0223)*** (0.0038)**  (0.0045)  (0.0094) 
year==2000  0.0066 0.0698 0.0206 0.0038 0.0025 0.0123 
  (0.0085) (0.0443) (0.0215) (0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0095) 
Constant  -0.0060 -0.0171 -0.0212 -0.0044 -0.0026 -0.0112 
  (0.0028)**  (0.0108) (0.0130) (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0088) 
Observations  2257 1338 1252 2256 1338 1252 
R-squared  0.08 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.11 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
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  OLS with robust standard errors  Outlier robust regression  
  ∆ credit  ∆ smtrade  ∆ smcap  ∆ credit  ∆ dsmtrade  ∆ smcap 
polity2  -0.0002  -0.0015  -0.0009  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0004 
  (0.0003)  (0.0007)**  (0.0006)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0006) 
(81-85)*polity2  0.0001  0.0013  0.0027  0.0004  0.0003  0.0009 
  (0.0003)  (0.0007)*  (0.0013)**  (0.0002)**  (0.0003)  (0.0007) 
(86-90)*polity2  0.0009  0.0006  0.0002  0.0007  0.0001  0.0005 
  (0.0005)**  (0.0005)  (0.0008)  (0.0002)*** (0.0003)  (0.0007) 
(91-95)*polity2  0.0005  0.0018  0.0008  0.0001  0.0004  -0.0000 
  (0.0004)  (0.0007)**  (0.0010)  (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0007) 
(96-2000)*polity2  0.0011  0.0058  0.0045  0.0010  0.0003  0.0015 
  (0.0005)**  (0.0014)*** (0.0012)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0003)  (0.0007)** 
durability2  0.0002  0.0006  0.0004  0.0001  0.0001  0.0003 
  (0.0000)***  (0.0002)**  (0.0002)**  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***  (0.0000)***
trade  0.0045 -0.0156  -0.0012  0.0045 -0.0019  -0.0147 
  (0.0024)*  (0.0067)** (0.0052)  (0.0019)** (0.0015)  (0.0033)***
Lbankcris  -0.0078 -0.0151 -0.0198 -0.0079 -0.0001 -0.0105 
 (0.0033)**  (0.0076)*  (0.0089)**  (0.0015)*** (0.0014)  (0.0030)***
Lgdpgrowth  0.0010 -0.0020  -0.0007  0.0009 -0.0002  0.0002 
 (0.0003)***  (0.0009)**  (0.0017)  (0.0001)*** (0.0001)  (0.0003) 
legor==2  -0.0001 0.0067  0.0056  -0.0001 -0.0006 0.0048 
  (0.0021) (0.0084) (0.0074) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0025)* 
legor==5  0.0313 0.0716 0.0470 0.0121 0.0658 0.0175 
  (0.0069)*** (0.0108)*** (0.0114)*** (0.0058)**  (0.0065)*** (0.0150) 
year==1976  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
year==1977  0.0032 0.0044 -0.0013  0.0053 -0.0020  -0.0009 
  (0.0028) (0.0047) (0.0096) (0.0039) (0.0051) (0.0123) 
year==1978  0.0134 0.0034 0.0000 0.0097 0.0041 0.0000 
  (0.0037)***  (0.0117) (0.0000) (0.0039)**  (0.0050) (0.0000) 
year==1979  0.0098 -0.0023  0.0148 0.0033 0.0009 0.0058 
  (0.0050)*  (0.0067) (0.0075)*  (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0112) 
year==1980  0.0025 0.0135 0.0164 0.0034 0.0035 0.0045 
  (0.0035) (0.0082) (0.0088)*  (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0111) 
year==1981  0.0120 0.0007 -0.0024  0.0092 -0.0006  -0.0000 
  (0.0036)***  (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0039)**  (0.0051) (0.0117) 
year==1982  0.0160 -0.0166  -0.0003  0.0080 -0.0033  -0.0030 
  (0.0040)***  (0.0128) (0.0097) (0.0039)**  (0.0051) (0.0112) 
year==1983  0.0072 0.0066 -0.0163  0.0061 0.0034 0.0070 
  (0.0034)**  (0.0095) (0.0244) (0.0038) (0.0051) (0.0113) 
year==1984  -0.0063 -0.0173 -0.0099 -0.0002 -0.0015 0.0076 
  (0.0050) (0.0116) (0.0185) (0.0038) (0.0051) (0.0111) 
year==1985  -0.0026  0.0182 0.0275 0.0008 0.0065 0.0137 
  (0.0039) (0.0124) (0.0163)*  (0.0038) (0.0051) (0.0111) 
year==1986  0.0062 0.0221 0.0565 0.0046 0.0121 0.0239 
  (0.0051) (0.0099)**  (0.0225)**  (0.0038) (0.0050)**  (0.0111)** 
year==1987  0.0008 0.0349 0.0483 0.0031 0.0050 0.0138 
  (0.0050) (0.0125)*** (0.0265)*  (0.0038) (0.0050) (0.0111) 
year==1988  0.0003 -0.0140  0.0286 0.0024 -0.0054  0.0126 
  (0.0046) (0.0117) (0.0171)*  (0.0038) (0.0050) (0.0110) 
year==1989  0.0059 0.0247 0.0100 0.0066 0.0062 0.0263 
  (0.0050)  (0.0127)* (0.0363)  (0.0038)* (0.0050)  (0.0110)** 
  29year==1990  0.0022 -0.0259  -0.0540  0.0033 -0.0047  -0.0049 
  (0.0040) (0.0136)*  (0.0431) (0.0038) (0.0050) (0.0110) 
year==1991  0.0018 -0.0112  0.0037 0.0028 0.0019 0.0111 
  (0.0039) (0.0101) (0.0116) (0.0038) (0.0050) (0.0110) 
year==1992  0.0033 0.0021 0.0201 0.0059 0.0004 0.0099 
  (0.0042) (0.0123) (0.0158) (0.0038) (0.0049) (0.0110) 
year==1993  0.0023 0.0803 0.0900 0.0048 0.0118 0.0354 
  (0.0042) (0.0360)**  (0.0237)*** (0.0038) (0.0049)**  (0.0108)***
year==1994  -0.0050 0.0031  0.0584  -0.0001 0.0103  0.0388 
  (0.0039) (0.0156) (0.0165)*** (0.0038) (0.0049)**  (0.0108)***
year==1995  0.0039 -0.0207  0.0013 0.0065 -0.0043  0.0149 
  (0.0043) (0.0167) (0.0116) (0.0038)*  (0.0048) (0.0107) 
year==1996  0.0069 -0.0004  0.0145 0.0036 0.0028 0.0152 
  (0.0043) (0.0182) (0.0207) (0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0106) 
year==1997  0.0111 0.0261 -0.0206  0.0076 0.0068 0.0193 
  (0.0043)** (0.0122)** (0.0250)  (0.0038)** (0.0048)  (0.0106)* 
year==1998  0.0220 -0.0098  0.0078 0.0155 -0.0007  0.0043 
  (0.0047)***  (0.0227) (0.0221) (0.0038)*** (0.0048) (0.0106) 
year==1999  0.0043 0.0610 0.0416 0.0051 0.0014 0.0052 
  (0.0045) (0.0325)*  (0.0179)**  (0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0106) 
year==2000  0.0030 0.0329 -0.0082  0.0013 0.0006 0.0034 
  (0.0076) (0.0407) (0.0201) (0.0039) (0.0048) (0.0106) 
Constant  -0.0048 -0.0018 -0.0079 -0.0039 -0.0003 -0.0073 
  (0.0027)*  (0.0087) (0.0129) (0.0030) (0.0044) (0.0097) 
Observations 2257 1338 1252 2257 1338 1252 
R-squared  0.09 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.12 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
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  OLS with robust standard errors  Outlier robust regression  
  ∆ credit  ∆ smtrade  ∆ smcap  ∆ credit  ∆ dsmtrade  ∆ smcap 
Lagged level  0.0108  0.0011  -0.0587  0.0202  0.0497  0.0467 
  (0.0032)***  (0.0810)  (0.0388)  (0.0022)*** (0.0021)***  (0.0032)***
polity2  0.0002  0.0006  0.0011  -0.0000  0.0001  0.0002 
  (0.0001)  (0.0005)  (0.0004)**  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0002) 
durability2  0.0001  0.0006  0.0006  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001 
  (0.0000)**  (0.0002)**  (0.0002)*** (0.0000)  (0.0000)**  (0.0000)** 
trade  0.0014 -0.0169  0.0293 0.0002 -0.0008  -0.0242 
  (0.0021) (0.0066)**  (0.0231) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0037)***
Lbankcris  -0.0077 -0.0153 -0.0235 -0.0074 0.0001  -0.0104 
 (0.0033)**  (0.0089)*  (0.0095)**  (0.0014)*** (0.0013)  (0.0030)***
Lgdpgrowth  0.0010 -0.0017  0.0002 0.0009 -0.0002  0.0002 
  (0.0003)***  (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0001)*** (0.0001) (0.0003) 
_Ilegor_2  -0.0002 0.0093  -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0009 0.0079 
  (0.0018) (0.0084) (0.0124) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0025)***
_Ilegor_5  0.0243 0.0463 0.0080 0.0102 0.0599 0.0223 
 (0.0100)**  (0.0121)*** (0.0141)  (0.0057)*  (0.0060)***  (0.0145) 
_Iyear_1976  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
_Iyear_1977  0.0030 0.0093 -0.0030  0.0054 -0.0015  -0.0005 
  (0.0028) (0.0045)**  (0.0090) (0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0121) 
_Iyear_1978  0.0130 0.0078 0.0000 0.0101 0.0045 0.0000 
  (0.0038)***  (0.0111) (0.0000) (0.0038)*** (0.0048) (0.0000) 
_Iyear_1979  0.0090 0.0021 0.0172 0.0031 0.0006 0.0067 
  (0.0051)*  (0.0064) (0.0075)**  (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0109) 
_Iyear_1980  0.0015 0.0174 0.0216 0.0029 0.0031 0.0063 
  (0.0035)  (0.0074)** (0.0090)** (0.0038)  (0.0048)  (0.0108) 
_Iyear_1981  0.0114 0.0113 0.0150 0.0090 0.0002 0.0045 
 (0.0035)***  (0.0064)*  (0.0072)**  (0.0038)**  (0.0046)  (0.0107) 
_Iyear_1982  0.0153 -0.0055  0.0188 0.0076 -0.0014  0.0008 
  (0.0040)***  (0.0103) (0.0102)*  (0.0038)**  (0.0046) (0.0102) 
_Iyear_1983  0.0063 0.0181 0.0051 0.0058 0.0051 0.0136 
  (0.0034)*  (0.0076)**  (0.0183) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0102) 
_Iyear_1984  -0.0070 -0.0059 0.0094  -0.0008 0.0010  0.0136 
  (0.0051) (0.0103) (0.0152) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0101) 
_Iyear_1985  -0.0033  0.0288 0.0448 0.0010 0.0077 0.0207 
  (0.0040)  (0.0144)** (0.0196)** (0.0037)  (0.0045)*  (0.0101)** 
_Iyear_1986  0.0068 0.0298 0.0641 0.0046 0.0125 0.0277 
  (0.0053) (0.0094)*** (0.0224)*** (0.0037) (0.0045)***  (0.0100)***
_Iyear_1987  0.0011 0.0421 0.0577 0.0039 0.0053 0.0180 
  (0.0053) (0.0121)*** (0.0286)**  (0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0100)* 
_Iyear_1988  0.0008 -0.0077  0.0410 0.0033 -0.0043  0.0143 
  (0.0048) (0.0119) (0.0216)*  (0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0099) 
_Iyear_1989  0.0065 0.0305 0.0226 0.0063 0.0065 0.0315 
  (0.0053) (0.0116)**  (0.0310) (0.0037)*  (0.0045) (0.0099)***
_Iyear_1990  0.0029  -0.0201 -0.0413 0.0035  -0.0040 -0.0007 
  (0.0041) (0.0147) (0.0396) (0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0099) 
_Iyear_1991  0.0015 0.0015 0.0163 0.0011 0.0031 0.0092 
  (0.0038) (0.0090) (0.0117) (0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0099) 
  31_Iyear_1992  0.0030 0.0155 0.0335 0.0040 0.0018 0.0092 
  (0.0042) (0.0114) (0.0144)**  (0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0099) 
_Iyear_1993  0.0021 0.0936 0.1032 0.0038 0.0122 0.0368 
  (0.0042) (0.0372)**  (0.0239)*** (0.0036) (0.0043)***  (0.0097)***
_Iyear_1994  -0.0053  0.0164 0.0774 -0.0015  0.0113 0.0353 
  (0.0038) (0.0155) (0.0182)*** (0.0036) (0.0043)***  (0.0097)***
_Iyear_1995  0.0036 -0.0079  0.0221 0.0047 -0.0045  0.0091 
  (0.0041) (0.0171) (0.0136) (0.0036) (0.0043) (0.0096) 
_Iyear_1996  0.0093 0.0346 0.0530 0.0063 0.0047 0.0233 
 (0.0042)**  (0.0198)*  (0.0255)**  (0.0036)*  (0.0043)  (0.0095)** 
_Iyear_1997  0.0134 0.0615 0.0193 0.0100 0.0062 0.0278 
  (0.0039)***  (0.0133)*** (0.0227) (0.0036)*** (0.0043) (0.0094)***
_Iyear_1998  0.0243 0.0262 0.0481 0.0191 0.0006 0.0117 
  (0.0044)***  (0.0254) (0.0268)*  (0.0037)*** (0.0043) (0.0094) 
_Iyear_1999  0.0064 0.0976 0.0841 0.0079 0.0010 0.0124 
 (0.0048)  (0.0409)**  (0.0229)*** (0.0037)**  (0.0042)  (0.0094) 
_Iyear_2000  0.0051 0.0696 0.0389 0.0044 0.0012 0.0085 
  (0.0086)  (0.0338)** (0.0180)** (0.0037)  (0.0043)  (0.0095) 
Constant -0.0062 -0.0187 -0.0228 -0.0056 -0.0009 -0.0136 
  (0.0028)**  (0.0095)*  (0.0160) (0.0029)*  (0.0039) (0.0087) 
Observations  2257 1338 1252 2257 1338 1252 
R-squared  0.09 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.43 0.26 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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  OLS with robust standard errors  Outlier robust regression  
  ∆ credit  ∆ smtrade  ∆ smcap  ∆ credit  ∆ dsmtrade  ∆ smcap 
Lagged Level  0.0108  0.0007  -0.0587  0.0202  0.0501  0.0472 
  (0.0031)***  (0.0813)  (0.0388)  (0.0022)***  (0.0021)***  (0.0031)***
polity2  0.0003  0.0002  0.0011  0.0000  0.0004  -0.0000 
  (0.0002)**  (0.0012)  (0.0010)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)**  (0.0003) 
Civil *polit_2  -0.0002  0.0006  0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0004  0.0003 
  (0.0003)  (0.0013)  (0.0011)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)**  (0.0004) 
Socialist*polit_5  -0.0019  -0.0058  -0.0011  0.0186  -0.0090  -0.0028 
  (0.0014)  (0.0024)**  (0.0024)  (0.0050)***  (0.0009)***  (0.0021) 
durability2  0.0001  0.0006  0.0006  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001 
  (0.0000)**  (0.0002)**  (0.0002)*** (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)** 
trade  0.0018 -0.0177  0.0293 0.0002 -0.0003  -0.0246 
  (0.0021) (0.0068)**  (0.0236) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0037)***
Lbankcris  -0.0077 -0.0153 -0.0235 -0.0075 0.0001  -0.0104 
 (0.0033)**  (0.0089)*  (0.0095)**  (0.0014)***  (0.0013)  (0.0030)***
Lgdpgrowth 0.0010  -0.0017 0.0002  0.0009  -0.0002 0.0002 
  (0.0003)*** (0.0010)  (0.0015)  (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*  (0.0003) 
_Ilegor_2  0.0004 0.0066 -0.0016  -0.0013  0.0005 0.0068 
  (0.0018) (0.0083) (0.0102) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0030)** 
_Ilegor_5  0.0142 0.0000 0.0000 0.1449 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0042)*** (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0337)*** (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
_Iyear_1976  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
_Iyear_1977  0.0030 0.0093 -0.0029  0.0054 -0.0016  -0.0002 
  (0.0028) (0.0044)**  (0.0090) (0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0121) 
_Iyear_1978  0.0130 0.0079 0.0000 0.0101 0.0042 0.0000 
  (0.0038)*** (0.0111)  (0.0000)  (0.0038)*** (0.0048)  (0.0000) 
_Iyear_1979  0.0091 0.0024 0.0172 0.0031 0.0003 0.0068 
  (0.0051)*  (0.0061) (0.0076)**  (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0109) 
_Iyear_1980  0.0016 0.0177 0.0217 0.0030 0.0029 0.0063 
  (0.0035) (0.0075)**  (0.0090)**  (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0108) 
_Iyear_1981  0.0114 0.0117 0.0151 0.0090 -0.0001  0.0047 
 (0.0035)***  (0.0066)*  (0.0072)**  (0.0038)**  (0.0046)  (0.0106) 
_Iyear_1982  0.0153 -0.0050  0.0188 0.0076 -0.0018  0.0010 
  (0.0040)***  (0.0099) (0.0104)*  (0.0038)**  (0.0046) (0.0102) 
_Iyear_1983  0.0064 0.0185 0.0051 0.0058 0.0046 0.0139 
  (0.0035)*  (0.0077)**  (0.0184) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0102) 
_Iyear_1984 -0.0070 -0.0056 0.0094  -0.0009 0.0009  0.0136 
  (0.0051) (0.0102) (0.0153) (0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0101) 
_Iyear_1985  -0.0031  0.0288 0.0448 0.0010 0.0076 0.0208 
  (0.0040) (0.0144)**  (0.0196)**  (0.0037) (0.0045)*  (0.0100)** 
_Iyear_1986  0.0070 0.0298 0.0641 0.0045 0.0126 0.0277 
  (0.0053) (0.0094)*** (0.0224)*** (0.0037) (0.0045)***  (0.0100)***
_Iyear_1987  0.0014 0.0420 0.0577 0.0039 0.0054 0.0180 
  (0.0053) (0.0120)*** (0.0286)**  (0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0100)* 
_Iyear_1988  0.0011 -0.0077  0.0410 0.0034 -0.0044  0.0143 
  (0.0050) (0.0118) (0.0216)*  (0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0099) 
_Iyear_1989  0.0069 0.0305 0.0226 0.0068 0.0064 0.0314 
  (0.0054) (0.0116)**  (0.0310) (0.0037)*  (0.0045) (0.0099)***
_Iyear_1990  0.0032 -0.0201  -0.0413  0.0035 -0.0040  -0.0005 
  33  (0.0042) (0.0147) (0.0396) (0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0099) 
_Iyear_1991  0.0017 0.0015 0.0163 0.0010 0.0030 0.0091 
  (0.0038) (0.0089) (0.0117) (0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0099) 
_Iyear_1992  0.0032 0.0155 0.0335 0.0041 0.0018 0.0091 
  (0.0042) (0.0114) (0.0144)**  (0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0099) 
_Iyear_1993  0.0023 0.0934 0.1032 0.0038 0.0124 0.0367 
  (0.0042) (0.0372)**  (0.0239)*** (0.0036) (0.0043)***  (0.0097)***
_Iyear_1994 -0.0051 0.0163  0.0774  -0.0015 0.0114  0.0354 
  (0.0038) (0.0154) (0.0182)*** (0.0036) (0.0043)***  (0.0096)***
_Iyear_1995  0.0039 -0.0080  0.0221 0.0048 -0.0044  0.0090 
  (0.0041) (0.0171) (0.0136) (0.0036) (0.0043) (0.0096) 
_Iyear_1996  0.0095 0.0345 0.0530 0.0062 0.0052 0.0233 
  (0.0042)**  (0.0198)* (0.0256)**  (0.0036)* (0.0043)  (0.0095)** 
_Iyear_1997  0.0136 0.0614 0.0193 0.0100 0.0060 0.0276 
  (0.0040)*** (0.0132)*** (0.0227)  (0.0036)*** (0.0042)  (0.0094)***
_Iyear_1998  0.0245 0.0261 0.0481 0.0192 0.0004 0.0117 
  (0.0044)*** (0.0254)  (0.0269)*  (0.0037)*** (0.0042)  (0.0094) 
_Iyear_1999  0.0067 0.0976 0.0841 0.0079 0.0010 0.0123 
  (0.0048)  (0.0409)** (0.0229)*** (0.0037)** (0.0042)  (0.0094) 
_Iyear_2000  0.0054 0.0695 0.0389 0.0043 0.0013 0.0084 
  (0.0086) (0.0338)**  (0.0180)**  (0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0094) 
Constant  -0.0067 -0.0170 -0.0228 -0.0056 -0.0016 -0.0130 
  (0.0027)**  (0.0100)* (0.0150)  (0.0029)* (0.0039)  (0.0087) 
Observations  2257 1338 1252 2256 1338 1252 
R-squared  0.09 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.43 0.27 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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  OLS with robust standard errors  Outlier robust regression  
  ∆ credit  ∆ smtrade  ∆ smcap  ∆ credit  ∆ dsmtrade  ∆ smcap 
Lagged Level  0.0099  -0.0035  -0.0591  0.0198  0.0500  0.0487 
  (0.0032)***  (0.0802)  (0.0382)  (0.0022)*** (0.0021)***  (0.0032)***
polity2  -0.0003  -0.0015  -0.0012  -0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0003 
  (0.0003)  (0.0006)**  (0.0007)*  (0.0002)**  (0.0002)  (0.0006) 
(81-85)*polity  0.0001  0.0013  0.0025  0.0004  0.0003  0.0009 
  (0.0003)  (0.0007)*  (0.0011)**  (0.0002)*  (0.0003)  (0.0007) 
(86-90)*polity  0.0009  0.0006  0.0008  0.0005  -0.0000  0.0003 
  (0.0005)*  (0.0005)  (0.0007)  (0.0002)**  (0.0003)  (0.0007) 
(91-95)*polity  0.0004  0.0018  0.0014  -0.0001  0.0002  -0.0004 
  (0.0004)  (0.0008)**  (0.0012)  (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0007) 
(96-00)*polity  0.0011  0.0059  0.0051  0.0009  0.0002  0.0014 
  (0.0005)**  (0.0014)*** (0.0013)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0003)  (0.0007)** 
durability  0.0001  0.0006  0.0006  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001 
  (0.0000)**  (0.0002)**  (0.0002)*** (0.0000)  (0.0000)**  (0.0000)* 
trade  0.0023 -0.0158  0.0304 0.0006 -0.0007  -0.0229 
  (0.0023) (0.0067)**  (0.0223) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0037)***
Lbankcris  -0.0075 -0.0152 -0.0230 -0.0074 0.0002  -0.0098 
 (0.0033)**  (0.0090)*  (0.0092)**  (0.0014)*** (0.0013)  (0.0030)***
Lgdpgrowth  0.0010  -0.0020 -0.0000 0.0009  -0.0002 0.0001 
  (0.0003)***  (0.0011)*  (0.0015) (0.0001)*** (0.0001) (0.0003) 
_Ilegor_2  -0.0007 0.0068  -0.0027 -0.0013 -0.0009 0.0074 
  (0.0018) (0.0084) (0.0122) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0025)***
_Ilegor_5  0.0269 0.0715 0.0277 0.0100 0.0605 0.0249 
 (0.0089)***  (0.0108)*** (0.0146)*  (0.0057)*  (0.0062)***  (0.0147)* 
_Iyear_1976 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
_Iyear_1977 0.0031 0.0043 -0.0023  0.0053 -0.0016  0.0001 
  (0.0028) (0.0047) (0.0091) (0.0038) (0.0049) (0.0120) 
_Iyear_1978 0.0133 0.0034 0.0000 0.0100 0.0042 0.0000 
  (0.0037)***  (0.0114) (0.0000) (0.0038)*** (0.0048) (0.0000) 
_Iyear_1979 0.0096 -0.0023  0.0146 0.0033 0.0003 0.0063 
  (0.0050)*  (0.0066) (0.0072)**  (0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0109) 
_Iyear_1980 0.0021 0.0135 0.0163 0.0033 0.0029 0.0050 
  (0.0035)  (0.0077)* (0.0087)* (0.0038)  (0.0048)  (0.0109) 
_Iyear_1981 0.0116 0.0007 -0.0007  0.0086 -0.0014  -0.0005 
  (0.0036)***  (0.0088) (0.0083) (0.0038)**  (0.0049) (0.0114) 
_Iyear_1982 0.0154 -0.0166  0.0026 0.0072 -0.0030  -0.0039 
  (0.0040)***  (0.0128) (0.0098) (0.0038)*  (0.0049) (0.0110) 
_Iyear_1983 0.0065 0.0066 -0.0116  0.0054 0.0037 0.0086 
  (0.0034)*  (0.0096) (0.0211) (0.0037) (0.0049) (0.0110) 
_Iyear_1984  -0.0070 -0.0171 -0.0071 -0.0012 -0.0007 0.0085 
  (0.0050) (0.0124) (0.0169) (0.0037) (0.0049) (0.0109) 
_Iyear_1985 -0.0031  0.0182 0.0287 0.0006 0.0062 0.0158 
  (0.0040) (0.0123) (0.0164)*  (0.0037) (0.0049) (0.0109) 
_Iyear_1986 0.0058 0.0220 0.0557 0.0041 0.0124 0.0251 
  (0.0051)  (0.0100)** (0.0219)** (0.0037)  (0.0048)** (0.0109)** 
_Iyear_1987 0.0003 0.0349 0.0498 0.0034 0.0049 0.0154 
  (0.0051) (0.0124)*** (0.0277)*  (0.0037) (0.0048) (0.0109) 
_Iyear_1988  -0.0002 -0.0139 0.0328  0.0028  -0.0052 0.0117 
  35  (0.0046) (0.0126) (0.0206) (0.0037) (0.0048) (0.0108) 
_Iyear_1989 0.0053 0.0248 0.0150 0.0058 0.0064 0.0289 
  (0.0050) (0.0130)*  (0.0322) (0.0037) (0.0048) (0.0108)***
_Iyear_1990  0.0016  -0.0257 -0.0490 0.0028  -0.0044 -0.0033 
  (0.0040) (0.0152)*  (0.0409) (0.0037) (0.0048) (0.0108) 
_Iyear_1991 0.0013 -0.0112  0.0055 0.0017 0.0016 0.0091 
  (0.0039) (0.0103) (0.0121) (0.0037) (0.0048) (0.0107) 
_Iyear_1992 0.0028 0.0021 0.0227 0.0049 0.0004 0.0091 
  (0.0042) (0.0125) (0.0167) (0.0037) (0.0047) (0.0107) 
_Iyear_1993 0.0019 0.0803 0.0919 0.0048 0.0112 0.0376 
  (0.0042) (0.0367)**  (0.0252)*** (0.0037) (0.0047)**  (0.0106)***
_Iyear_1994 -0.0055  0.0035 0.0661 -0.0007  0.0099 0.0369 
  (0.0039) (0.0156) (0.0194)*** (0.0037) (0.0047)**  (0.0105)***
_Iyear_1995 0.0035 -0.0204  0.0110 0.0062 -0.0060  0.0106 
  (0.0043) (0.0172) (0.0124) (0.0037)*  (0.0046) (0.0105) 
_Iyear_1996 0.0064 -0.0002  0.0226 0.0034 0.0033 0.0150 
  (0.0043) (0.0197) (0.0238) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0104) 
_Iyear_1997 0.0106 0.0264 -0.0117  0.0075 0.0049 0.0182 
  (0.0042)** (0.0129)** (0.0222)  (0.0037)** (0.0046)  (0.0104)* 
_Iyear_1998 0.0214 -0.0093  0.0163 0.0163 -0.0008  0.0032 
  (0.0045)***  (0.0244) (0.0241) (0.0037)*** (0.0046) (0.0104) 
_Iyear_1999 0.0035 0.0615 0.0519 0.0050 -0.0003  0.0044 
  (0.0045) (0.0390) (0.0188)*** (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0104) 
_Iyear_2000 0.0021 0.0338 0.0063 0.0020 -0.0001  -0.0006 
  (0.0077) (0.0321) (0.0169) (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0104) 
Constant  -0.0055 -0.0018 -0.0063 -0.0053 0.0001  -0.0102 
  (0.0027)**  (0.0083) (0.0157) (0.0029)*  (0.0042) (0.0095) 
Observations  2257 1338 1252 2257 1338 1252 
R-squared 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.43 0.28 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
  
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
     
 
Table 8 
Pair-wise correlations for levels of financial development 
 
  credit      smtrade      smcap        polity2    Durability  Herfindahl      
credit 1.0000   
smtrade  0.4748   1.0000  
sm cap  0.5317   0.4951     1.0000  
Polity2  0.3927   0.1039     0.1619      1.0000  
Durability  0.4511   0.1625     0.3777     0.2293       1.0000  
Herfindahl  -0.2378  -0.0192   -0.0600   -0.6322      -0.1363     1.0000  
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Panel Logit results for whether stock market capitalisation is observed 
 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error 
Polity  .2466617***  .0183419 
Durability  .1245383***  .0081673 











Panel Tobit results for limited dependent variable SMCAP 
 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error 
Polity  .0326142***   .0049437 
Durability  .0111681***   .0013551 
L.bank crisis  .2298538***  .0805943   
L.GDP growth  .021792***    .0074284 
trade  -.0039464***  .0009054   
Civil Law  -.9258388***    .0939532 
Socialist Law  -3.504303***   .2762773 
Constant -12.77935  ***  .2008821 
# of observations:  2648  1396 left-censored 
observations 
 





Panel Tobit results for limited dependent variable SMTRADE 
 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error 
Polity  .0890944***  .006755 
Durability  .0146644***  .0013064 
L.bank crisis  .2169186***  .0779959 
L.GDP growth  .0086983     .0064918 
trade -.0037966***  .0009041 
Civil Law  -.3408615***  .0885858 
Socialist Law  -1.837788***  .2425709 
Constant  -3.427124     .1728336 
# of observations:  2675  1337 left-censored 
observations 
 
(Year dummies included but coefficients not reported) 
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Table A  
Political regimes and financial development: 
GMM estimates 
  ∆ credit  ∆ deposits  ∆ smcap 
polity2 0.0005 0.0004 0.0009 
  (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0004)** 
durability  0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 
 (0.0000)***  (0.0000)*  (0.0001)*** 
trade  0.0036 0.0297 -0.0009 
 (0.0023)  (0.0070)***  (0.0043) 
Lbankcris  -0.0078 -0.0001 -0.0203 
 (0.0033)**  (0.0027)  (0.0088)** 
Lgdpgrowth  0.0011 0.0009 -0.0006 
  (0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0017) 
Civil Law   0.0008  0.0011  0.0068 
  (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0080) 
Socialist  Law  0.0305 0.0481 0.0516 
  (0.0077)*** (0.0175)*** (0.1521) 
year==1976  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
year==1977 -0.0037  0.0020  0.0466 
  (0.0050) (0.0044) (0.0461) 
year==1978  0.0064 0.0017 0.0481 
  (0.0056) (0.0047) (0.0435) 
year==1979 0.0029  -0.0079  0.0643 
  (0.0070) (0.0059) (0.0445) 
year==1980  -0.0048 -0.0096 0.0685 
 (0.0057)  (0.0053)*  (0.0453) 
year==1981  0.0051 0.0059 0.0615 
  (0.0052) (0.0059) (0.0442) 
year==1982  0.0088 0.0090 0.0638 
  (0.0058) (0.0065) (0.0463) 
year==1983  0.0003 0.0024 0.0473 
  (0.0053) (0.0049) (0.0480) 
year==1984  -0.0127 -0.0040 0.0533 
 (0.0059)**  (0.0052)  (0.0490) 
year==1985  -0.0095 -0.0035 0.0911 
 (0.0040)**  (0.0044)  (0.0605) 
year==1986  0.0000 0.0000 0.1077 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0615)* 
year==1987  -0.0048 -0.0032 0.0998 
  (0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0662) 
year==1988  -0.0060 -0.0052 0.0808 
  (0.0056) (0.0058) (0.0561) 
year==1989 0.0001  -0.0066  0.0633 
  (0.0065) (0.0056) (0.0162)*** 
year==1990  -0.0033 -0.0124 0.0000 
 (0.0051)  (0.0054)**  (0.0000) 
year==1991  -0.0047 -0.0043 0.0594 
  (0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0434) 
  38year==1992  -0.0031 -0.0001 0.0756 
  (0.0060) (0.0050) (0.0422)* 
year==1993 -0.0040  0.0012  0.1428 
  (0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0490)*** 
year==1994  -0.0115 -0.0067 0.1130 
 (0.0054)**  (0.0048)  (0.0492)** 
year==1995  -0.0029 -0.0083 0.0576 
 (0.0053)  (0.0047)*  (0.0476) 
year==1996 0.0026  -0.0015  0.0904 
  (0.0056) (0.0060) (0.0497)* 
year==1997  0.0066 0.0024 0.0555 
  (0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0519) 
year==1998  0.0176 0.0079 0.0860 
 (0.0055)***  (0.0050)  (0.0497)* 
year==1999  0.0008 0.0149 0.1213 
  (0.0069) (0.0096) (0.0452)*** 
year==2000 -0.0004  0.0116  0.0696 
  (0.0098) (0.0121) (0.0461) 
Constant 0.0005  -0.0037  -0.0698 
  (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0378)* 
Hansen’s J-test  (p-
value) 
0.598 0.3020  0.7265 
First-stage R-squared 
value  
0.8729 0.8739 0.8649 
Hausman test of 
exogeneity (p-value) 
1 1 1 
Observations  2179 2209 1252 
 
Notes: 
1.  The null hypothesis of the Hansen’s J-test  states that the instruments used in the GMM 
estimations are valid 
2.  The tests of exogeneity is a  Hausman test which examines the null hypothesis that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the OLS and GMM estimates. The null hypothesis 
states that Polity2 is exogenous 
3.  significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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